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amerIcaS
colombIa’S exPanSIon of mIlItary 
JurISdIctIon under fIre
The Colombian government has histor-
ically struggled to hold military officials 
accountable for human rights violations 
committed during the armed conflict with 
leftist guerillas. After the military’s “false-
positives” scandal in 2008 revealed that 
soldiers staged battles and killed civilians 
they had dressed as guerillas to increase 
body counts and thus receive financial 
bonuses, former President Álvaro Uribe 
ordered that cases dealing with human 
rights violations by military personnel be 
adjudicated by civilian courts to ensure 
impartiality. Civilian jurisdiction over 
these cases could now be reduced under 
a controversial constitutional amendment, 
which would strengthen and reform 
military courts, proposed by President 
Juan Manuel Santos’ government.
On December 11, 2012, the Colombian 
Senate approved the proposed constitu-
tional amendment. The amendment sur-
faced as a response to reports of unfair 
rulings for military personnel in civilian 
courts. According to military officials, the 
uncertainty arising from prosecuting mili-
tary officials in civilian courts has been 
detrimental to soldiers’ combat and oper-
ational responsibilities. The legislation 
would grant the military justice system 
jurisdiction over crimes of service, while 
keeping crimes such as murder, extraju-
dicial executions, and other human rights 
violations in civilian courts. The Tribunal 
of Criminal Guarantees (Tribunal de 
Garantías), which includes both civilians 
and former military officials, would make 
the threshold jurisdictional determination.
The point of contention over the 
amendment is its ambiguity regarding the 
scope of military service and what cir-
cumvents the military court’s jurisdiction. 
While the Colombian Supreme Court has 
held that human rights should always be 
adjudicated in civilian courts, the lack 
of a definition for “extrajudicial execu-
tions” in the proposed amendment compli-
cates the Supreme Court’s ability to grant 
exclusive jurisdiction to civilian courts for 
“false positives” cases. The new amend-
ment would once again expand military 
jurisdiction over cases arising from mili-
tary service.
President Santos and Minister of 
Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón support mili-
tary judicial reform as a way to ensure that 
adequate measures are taken to investigate 
and adjudicate military crimes. Advocates 
for reform reiterate that human rights 
violations will continue to be sent to civil-
ian courts and will not remain under the 
jurisdiction of military courts. The Senate 
approved the amendment with a specified 
list of violations that would always be 
transferred to civilian courts. Supporters of 
the reforms view them as a way to ensure 
judicial accountability through courts-mar-
tial in military courts and the due process 
and sentencing in civilian courts for crimes 
outside the scope of military service.
The amendment has faced heavy criti-
cisms from international organizations 
and human rights advocates. José Miguel 
Vivanco, Director of Human Rights 
Watch’s Americas division, echoed many 
of the concerns that these advocates have 
about a historically weak military justice 
system that would grant impunity to mili-
tary criminals. Amnesty International also 
stated its fears that the Tribunal of Criminal 
Guarantees would easily be persuaded to 
allow certain human rights violations, such 
as “false-positives,” to be heard in military 
courts, which would contradict interna-
tional norms and the Supreme Court’s 
1997 decision. In that decision, human 
rights advocates were able to ensure the 
inclusion of a list of crimes that would 
remain out of the jurisdiction of military 
courts, but the ambiguity of the term 
“extrajudicial executions” could exclude 
the false-positive killings.
Human Rights Watch points to rulings 
in the Colombian Supreme Court as well 
as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ (IACTHR) 2008 ruling in Rochela 
v. Colombia, where the Court determined 
that a military court does not have juris-
diction to adjudicate or investigate any 
military issues that relate to alleged human 
rights violations. While the Minister of 
Defense insists that any cases dealing with 
human rights will be transferred to civilian 
jurisdiction, advocates point to a cumber-
some and slow system in which military 
judges are weary of transferring cases 
for fear of retaliation by their peers. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions noted in 2010 that Colombia’s 
failure to adequately transfer cases created 
a judicial system that often could not effec-
tively determine the appropriate jurisdic-
tion for a case.
Both the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) 
have expressed their disapproval of the 
proposed amendment, and the IACtHR has 
determined that the amendment does not 
meet the OAS’s human rights standards. 
If the Colombian Congress approves the 
amendment, the International Federation of 
Human Rights, a coalition of human rights 
organizations, may seek an investigation 
by the International Criminal Court into 
Colombia as a state with a “lack of will to 
prosecute,” which could result in the pros-
ecution of Colombian military officials 
accused of human rights violations.
Effective controls for transferring 
and determining jurisdiction, as well as 
concrete definitions for crimes automati-
cally under civilian jurisdiction, are now 
potential additions to the amendment. 
The amendment will now be voted on in 
Colombia’s House of Representatives for 
ratification. As Santos’ government con-
tinues peace talks with leftist guerillas, 
Colombia is struggling to meld domestic 
legal accountability for military crimes 
with its responsibility to adjudicate alleged 
human rights violations in civilian courts.
no SwearIng (In): IS Venezuelan 
offIcIalS’ SIlencIng of the medIa a 
VIolatIon of human rIghtS?
As Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez 
continues his cancer recovery, a battle 
between the Chavistas and the president’s 
opposition is growing over the disputed 
constitutionality of the delayed swearing 
in of the president for his newest term. The 
public debate over the delay created media 
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coverage on Chávez’s condition and the 
legality of postponing the oath of office. 
The Chávez Administration is taking steps 
to downplay the increasing pressure com-
ing from the opposition’s stance against 
allowing the presidency to remain in limbo 
with Chávez outside of the country.
Following Chávez’s reelection, he 
traveled to Cuba for a fourth surgery 
in December 2012 and has remained 
there since to recover. The Venezuelan 
Constitution stipulates that the president-
elect must be sworn into office on January 
10. On January 8, 2013, the Chávez 
Administration announced that the presi-
dent would be unable to return to Venezuela 
to take the formal oath of office; instead, 
he would take the oath before the country’s 
highest court upon full recovery. As the 
January 10 deadline passed, the opposition 
called for new elections and marched in 
protest of the postponed swearing-in.
With the opposition demanding a 
response from the government, the pro-
Chávez National Assembly supported the 
delay, declaring that it would give the presi-
dent as much time as required for him to 
recover. The Venezuelan Supreme Court 
also ruled that the delay was legal under the 
Venezuelan Constitution. The Court’s unan-
imous decision emphasized that the oath 
was an important formality of the beginning 
of a presidential term but not indispens-
able. The Court noted that the Venezuelan 
Constitution grants it the authority to allow 
the oath to occur later unless the president’s 
absence becomes permanent.
The National Telecommunication Council 
of Venezuela (CONTATEL) officially 
opened investigations against Globovisión 
after it questioned the constitutionality of the 
court’s decision. This investigation follows 
the January 6 raid of blogger Medina Ravell’s 
home after he questioned the information 
given by the government regarding President 
Chávez’s health.
CONTATEL relied on Article 27 of 
Venezuela’s broadcasting law to cease 
showing certain segments dealing with 
President Chávez’s health and the consti-
tutionality of the delayed oath. The law 
prohibits the broadcasting of materials 
that “foment anxiety in the population or 
threaten public order,” and delegitimizes 
government authorities. The government 
also cited a provision of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Right’s 
(ICCPR’s) Article 19(3)(b) that allows 
governments to restrict freedom of expres-
sion to protect national security and pub-
lic order. CONTATEL ordered the halt of 
transmissions of speeches questioning the 
legitimacy of the government’s position and 
criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Globovisión is potentially facing sanctions, 
including a brief shutdown or a fine of up 
to ten percent of its gross annual income.
Sanctioning media outlets and social 
media forums for discussing the current 
state of Venezuelan politics has been criti-
cized by members of the international 
community as political censorship. The 
domestic broadcasting law is now seem-
ingly in conflict with Venezuela’s commit-
ment to adhere to the ICCPR that guar-
antees the right to freedom of expression. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the right 
to seek, receive, and impart information 
regardless of frontiers or media sources.
The Office of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Freedom of Expression for the 
Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (IACHR) has previously accused 
the Venezuelan government of media cen-
sorship through the detention of journalists 
and the prohibition of the circulation of 
certain publications. In a communication 
to the Foreign Minister of Venezuela in 
June 2010, Special Rapporteur Catalina 
Botero Marino expressed her deep concern 
over the use of instruments such as crimi-
nal law to silence dissent in the country. 
The IACHR also noted in a 2010 report 
that Venezuelan journalists are not “able 
to freely carry out their work” and that a 
pattern of impunity for violence against 
media members continues to hamper free-
dom of expression in the country. The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in 
its 2009 decision Perozo et.al. v. Venezuela, 
held that Venezuela needed to continue to 
strengthen its redress and criminal investi-
gations for violations of freedom of speech 
and adopt measures to reduce impediments 
to the freedom of speech and media.
With the support of the Venezuelan 
Supreme Court and Vice President Nicolas 
Maduro moving the administration for-
ward, the opposition to the constitutional-
ity of the oath delay continues to diminish. 
The absence of Chávez was ruled to be a 
“temporary absence” by the highest court 
in Venezuela and as long as he eventu-
ally returns, he will continue to enjoy 
support from the National Assembly and 
other officials within the government. The 
constitutionality of the delay could become 
a moot point if President Chávez’s recov-
ery is weeks away, as indicated by Vice 
President Maduro.
With the legality of the delay of the 
oath affirmed by the Supreme Court, the 
more prominent issue continues to be the 
treatment and censorship of the media 
in relation to its criticism of the gov-
ernment. CONTATEL’s investigation into 
Globovisión is the most recent attempt to 
censor government critics in the media. The 
practice of attempting to control informa-
tion has continued throughout the Chávez 
Administration and included charges of 
offenses “contrary to national security” 
that have resulted in self-censorship by 
members of the media.
In November, the IACHR held a hear-
ing where members of the Venezuelan 
media alleged that the Venezuelan govern-
ment impeded their ability to gain access 
to public information. The journalists 
alleged that the intimidation tactics have 
resulted in censorship that violates Article 
57 of the Venezuela Constitution. While 
Venezuela continues to deny working out-
side of its international legal obligations, 
the line between censorship and protection 
of public order continues to blur.
Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
female mIgrant farmworkerS are 
often targetS of Sexual VIolence 
and haraSSment
Migrant farmworkers are often excluded 
from basic worker protections, leading to 
instances of wage theft, child labor, haz-
ardous working conditions, and pesticide 
exposure. These abuses are predominantly 
attributed to the fact that the majority of 
farmworkers are undocumented or are 
employed through a guest worker program 
that lacks government oversight, conse-
quently placing these individuals at risk 
of serious human rights violations. The 
ability to join labor unions and to access 
collective bargaining is largely nonexistent 
for many farmworkers, further exacerbat-
ing a severe power imbalance between 
employers and migrant farmworkers. This 
power imbalance also leads to additional 
abuse of female farmworkers who are sub-
jected to sexual violence and harassment 
at the hands of their male bosses including 
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rape, stalking, and unwanted touching. 
These women face significant hurdles in 
accessing justice for these crimes due to 
fear of reprisals, deportation, and separa-
tion from their children. As a result, many 
women do not report crimes, allowing 
reoccurrence of the abuse.
According to Human Rights Watch, at 
least fifty percent of the agricultural work-
force in the United States is comprised 
of unauthorized immigrants. Moreover, 
those holding temporary worker visas 
greatly depend upon their employer for 
their continued stay in the United States, 
which contributes to the power disparity. 
Of the estimated 1.8 million agricultural 
workers, approximately 24 percent are 
female. Human Rights Watch interviewed 
fifty female farmworkers countrywide and 
reportedly almost every woman personally 
experienced sexual violence or harassment 
or knew of someone who personally expe-
rienced sexual violence or harassment. 
Perpetrators are typically foremen, super-
visors, farm labor contractors, company 
owners, and others in a position of power 
over farmworkers.
The U.S. government ratified the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and therefore 
is legally obligated to guarantee all per-
sons within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the right to security of 
persons, the right to be free from torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, and the right to redress when sexual 
abuses occur. Furthermore, under Article 
26 of the ICCPR as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the 
United States is required to provide equal 
protection of the law irrespective of a 
person’s legal status. United States law 
prohibits workplace sexual harassment 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, which must be equally realized by the 
entire U.S. workforce.
Despite the aforementioned safeguards, 
the U.S. government is falling short in its 
duty to protect persons growing U.S. food. 
Reauthorization of the Senate version of 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 
would provide additional protections for 
undocumented women who are victims of 
sexual violence, yet it remains stalled in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. Through 
VAWA, the U-visa program provides 
undocumented victims legal status and 
work authorization when reporting violent 
crimes, ultimately ensuring protection for 
the victim and minimizing fear of deporta-
tion. Since the institution of the program, 
U-visas have been instrumental in provid-
ing a measure of protection for victims 
otherwise without legal options of recourse. 
The U.S. government is obligated to provide 
effective legal remedies as enumerated in 
Article 2 of the ICCPR; therefore, a lack of 
provision may constitute a failure to meet its 
human rights responsibilities.
The U.S. government has also failed to 
enact a comprehensive national solution 
to immigration that respects the rights of 
everyone within U.S. borders. Deportation 
continues to be used as a tool to threaten 
and disempower undocumented farmwork-
ers, putting the population at risk of sexual 
violence and harassment. Providing legal 
status for farmworkers will afford neces-
sary protections for the population, which 
will help realize the country’s international 
human rights obligations. Meaningful 
immigration reform will also abate fears 
of deportation for many, thus ensuring 
access to justice for victims who are cur-
rently unable to report inhumane working 
conditions or other crimes.
The widespread abuses facing female 
agricultural workers are likely a product of 
a failing immigration system and barriers 
to reporting sexual abuse. The U.S. gov-
ernment is obligated to protect all persons 
within its borders, including the 11.1 mil-
lion undocumented individuals currently in 
the United States. Legislation addressing 
the undocumented workforce and affording 
necessary protections in line with human 
rights principles will advance the govern-
ment’s responsibility to protect all persons 
living and working in the United States. 
Legal status will result in increased access 
to mechanisms that protect the human rights 
of farmworkers, which will effectively 
expand their leverage to speak out and 
expose inhumane working conditions in the 
country. Victims of sexual abuse will also 
be able to access a ready means of redress 
without fear of deportation since their abil-
ity to stay in the country would no longer 
depend on employers.
wIthout a legal home: 
StateleSSneSS In the bahamaS
Thousands of Bahamian-born persons 
of Haitian descent are stateless. Although 
the stateless situation of Dominican-
born persons of Haitian descent has 
been well-documented, the situation of 
Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent 
remains largely unstudied, limiting the 
international community’s understanding 
of the gravity of this problem. According to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, an individual is stateless when he 
or she is without a nationality or citizenship 
in any state. Statelessness occurs when a 
person never obtains citizenship in his or 
her birth country or when a person loses 
citizenship in one country and has no claim 
to citizenship in another country. Estimates 
of approximately 30,000 to 50,000 Haitian 
immigrants and their children are denied 
Bahamian citizenship — despite some 
being born in the Bahamas — and are also 
without citizenship in Haiti, leaving them in 
a state of limbo with no place to officially 
call home. Children born to non-Bahamian 
parents or to a Bahamian mother and a non-
Bahamian father born outside the Bahamas 
are not able to automatically obtain citi-
zenship upon birth. These children, even 
though born in the Bahamas, cannot apply 
for citizenship until their eighteenth birth-
day. Furthermore, due to significant hurdles 
and long waiting times during the applica-
tion process, generations are reportedly left 
de facto stateless.
Nationality is the legal bond an indi-
vidual has with a state. Living without 
a nationality has dire consequences to 
individuals because it prevents them from 
benefiting from the protection and assis-
tance of the government. As a result of 
Bahamian exclusionary policies, individu-
als are often marginalized and live in 
extreme poverty, without access to basic 
services, including education, health ser-
vices, and legal processes for instances of 
abuse and exploitation. A large number 
of Haitians and Haitian Bahamians who 
cannot afford their own property in the 
Bahamas live in shantytowns, all without 
running water, electricity, or waste man-
agement. Tensions in society are mount-
ing as Haitians and Haitian Bahamians 
are unjustifiably blamed for the country’s 
crime problems and lack of resources.
The Bahamas is a State Party to the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), which provides in Article 7 that 
a child shall have the right to acquire 
a nationality immediately after birth. 
Upon ratification, however, the govern-
ment made specific reservations relating 
to Article 2, which requires States Parties 
to ensure that each child enjoys the rights 
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enumerated in the Convention irrespective 
of the child’s or his or her parent’s national, 
ethnic or social origin, “insofar as the provi-
sion relates to the conferment of citizenship 
upon a child.” Nonetheless, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), in Articles 15 and 
24 respectively, provide every child the right 
to nationality. In 2008, the Bahamas ratified 
the ICCPR, requiring the country to fully 
implement the provisions into domestic law.
As a State Party to the ICCPR, the 
Bahamas is legally obligated to ensure 
children born in the Bahamas have access 
to a nationality. The government of the 
Bahamas has argued that those born in 
the Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents 
can acquire citizenship elsewhere or 
can wait until their eighteenth birthday, 
options they allege fulfill their obligations. 
However, for many, obtaining citizenship 
elsewhere proves futile or, more impor-
tantly, unreasonable since the Bahamas is 
the only country they have ever known. 
Additionally, some applicants wait years 
to be approved for Bahamian citizenship.
Countries like the United States that 
have birthright citizenship laws guaran-
tee citizenship and equal standing under 
the law to all who are born in the United 
States. A number of countries have moved 
away from automatically guaranteeing citi-
zenship upon birth — including Australia, 
Ireland, India, the United Kingdom, and 
the Dominican Republic — contributing 
to the already-existing and serious problem 
of statelessness. Countries that experience 
high volumes of immigrants who tend to 
remain in the country long-term, like the 
Bahamas, may need to consider national-
ity legislation in accordance with interna-
tional human rights norms.
In order to fulfill its obligations under 
the ICCPR, the Bahamian government 
must ensure all persons born on its soil 
have access to a nationality. Through effec-
tive nationality legislation and a universal 
birth registration, Bahamian people’s right 
to nationality will be protected against 
potentially discriminatory practices which 
target minority groups. If children are 
registered upon birth, all Bahamians — 
regardless of descent — will have access 
to birth papers and therefore will not be 
prevented from enjoying equal access to 
opportunities, including in the fields of 
education, employment, and health.
Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
aSIa and oceanIa
brIdal kIdnaPPIng: a kyrgyz 
method of marrIage
On the eve of their wedding, a third of 
all Kyrgyz brides hear the traditional man-
tra: “Every good marriage begins in tears.” 
The custom, known as ala kachuu (or “grab 
and run”), has been on the rise for the last 
fifty years. Between eight and twelve thou-
sand girls are kidnapped and forced into 
marriage each year. Because of the stigma 
surrounding the socialization of single men 
and women, and the rising expense of a 
traditional dowry, some Kyrgyz men have 
found kidnapping to be a cheaper alterna-
tive to courtship. Under current Kyrgyz law, 
a man will face a maximum of five years 
in prison for forcing a woman to marry 
against her will, but he will face eleven 
years for stealing cattle. As the Kyrgyz 
parliament moves to reform the laws con-
cerning bride-kidnapping, it is obligated 
to abide by the terms of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), United Nations Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women, the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriage. 
The Declaration preceded the drafting of 
CEDAW, and Kyrgyzstan has since acceded 
to all three conventions.
Under this practice, when a man decides 
to take a wife, he will gather a large group 
of his male peers and plot to get the woman 
alone. The woman is then forcibly taken to 
the man’s home, where her future in-laws 
attempt to subdue her long enough to get 
a shawl, symbolizing submission, onto her 
head. The woman is raped on the first night 
— if she is not, the community will still 
treat her as unchaste anyway. In the morn-
ing, the woman must choose between mar-
riage and banishment from society. Eighty 
percent of kidnapped women choose mar-
riage. Under the ICCPR, Kyrgyzstan is 
obliged to ensure “no marriage shall be 
entered into without the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.” The 
Convention on Consent to Marriage raises 
this bar by requiring that consent “be 
expressed by them in person after due 
publicity and in the presence of the author-
ity competent to solemnize the marriage 
and of witnesses.” However, while formal 
consent requirements may provide some 
safeguards for Kyrgyz women, no current 
international obligations can adequately 
deal with the reality that many kidnapped 
women will be viewed as “unfit to marry” 
after being raped.
The rate of spousal abuse is much 
higher in forced marriages, where the 
women are often beaten, starved, stabbed, 
raped, isolated, and even killed. In the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, the United Nations 
General Assembly urged that Member 
States “condemn violence against women 
and should not invoke any custom, tradi-
tion or religious consideration to avoid 
their obligation with respect to its elimina-
tion.” Physical, sexual, and psychologi-
cal violence within the family; dowry-
related violence; and marital rape are 
included within the definition of “vio-
lence against women.” Former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
Radhika Coomaraswamy also stated that 
religious and cultural considerations were 
not a legitimate reason to justify violence 
against women.
In 2009, the Special Rapporteur visited 
Kyrgyzstan and issued a report, which 
included the issue of bride-kidnapping. 
Among the numerous recommendations 
suggested by the report, Kyrgyzstan was 
urged to “increase the criminal penalty for 
bride abduction and coercion into mar-
riage, withdraw the possibility of imposing 
only a fine and provide stringent penalties 
for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in 
this crime.” Although Kyrgyzstan is not 
legally bound by the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, 
it is obligated to provide the reforms 
outlined in CEDAW. This includes tak-
ing “all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
laws, regulations, customs and practices 
which constitute discrimination against 
women.” Under the CEDAW requirements, 
Kyrgyzstan is also legally obliged to “mod-
ify the social and cultural patterns of con-
duct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
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the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.”
For Kyrgyzstan to comply with its 
international obligations concerning the 
rights of women, it is legally obligated to 
reform its laws and penalties regarding 
forced marriage. Given the modifications 
to the Kyrgyz Constitution in 2010, change 
seems to be on the horizon. The new consti-
tution includes the following clause, which 
is a hopeful sign for the necessary reforms: 
“In the Kyrgyz Republic men and women 
shall have equal rights and freedoms and 
equal opportunities for their realization.” 
The implementation and enforcement of 
international principles relating to women 
could prove to be a good starting place for 
reform.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
legal roadblockS hInder north 
korean mIgrantS’ effortS to 
eScaPe oPPreSSIVe condItIonS
North Koreans seeking to flee the 
reportedly oppressive conditions within 
the country face a crackdown on defec-
tors instituted by Supreme Leader Kim 
Jong-Un while struggling to find pro-
tections in nearby states. According to 
reports, shortly after assuming leadership 
from his late father, Kim Jong-Il, Jong-Un 
ordered border police to execute defectors 
on site, and made defection “a crime of 
treachery against the nation.”
Despite the risk, thousands continue to 
flee the country every year and criticism 
continues to mount against the nation’s 
practices. In March of 2012, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council indicated 
its concern over the North Korean govern-
ment’s significant human rights violations. 
Reports out of the country allege system-
atic use of torture, inhumane prison condi-
tions, incarceration for political beliefs, 
forced labor, and arbitrary application of 
the death penalty. Even those not detained 
are affected by the pervasive malnourish-
ment resulting from a lack of food security.
To escape the conditions, many North 
Korean defectors seek refuge in South 
Korea, which is an extremely difficult jour-
ney both physically and legally. A heavily 
fortified demilitarized zone makes cross-
ing directly into South Korea difficult, so 
most defectors instead travel north through 
China to third states, such as Thailand or 
Mongolia, where they seek refuge in South 
Korean consulates. Estimates indicate that 
up to 200,000 North Koreans are in hid-
ing in China where they are vulnerable to 
exploitation, forced marriages, and human 
trafficking. Only about 25,000 have suc-
cessfully completed the journey to South 
Korea. The number of North Koreans 
arriving in South Korea fell to a ten-
year low in 2012; only 1,509 successfully 
completed the journey, almost half of the 
amount in 2011.
For those who do not make it to South 
Korea, a difficult legal journey may also 
ensue as defectors are detained, mostly 
in southern China. The policy of repatria-
tion is controlled by a bilateral treaty, the 
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work 
of Maintaining National Security and 
Social Order in the Border Areas between 
North Korea and China, which stipulates 
in Article 4 that the two countries will 
work together to prevent residents from 
illegally crossing the border but allows 
residents to cross the boundary legally 
due to “calamity or unavoidable factors.” 
However China generally does not recog-
nize North Koreans as meeting this stan-
dard and instead deems them “economic 
migrants.” The determination thus leads to 
return to North Korea.
Also relevant, however, is the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol, which impose direct obli-
gations upon China, a State Party to both, 
as well as possibly context for interpreta-
tion of the bilateral treaty, under Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. The Refugee Convention 
defines a refugee under Article 1 as a per-
son who, “owing to a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality, 
and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country.” Although the Convention 
has its limits, under Article 33 it prohibits 
refoulement, the return of a refugee to 
a territory where his or her life or lib-
erty would be threatened “on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”
The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
makes clear that economic migrants are 
not necessarily refugees, though economic 
migrants can attain refugee status if, after 
expatriation, they cannot return due to fear 
of persecution under one of the prescribed 
criteria. China has declined to grant refu-
gee status to North Korean defectors, but 
other States have, including the United 
States, adding credence to the argument 
that the defectors qualify as refugees. 
UNHCR declared seven North Korean 
defectors as refugees in 2001 and in 2012 
called on China to respect non-refoulement; 
however the agency also generally refers to 
the defectors as “detained North Koreans.”
China refuses to grant UNHCR access 
to the North Koreans seeking refugee sta-
tus. Furthermore, China continues to read 
the bilateral treaty to provide for return of 
North Korean defectors, and China returns 
5,000 North Korean detainees annually. 
This discourages defection; would-be 
defectors must evaluate the high risks 
involved in fleeing. Fear of being detained 
and forcibly returned, coupled with fear of 
harsh punishment upon return, likely pre-
vents many from trying, but some North 
Koreans still brave the risks.
chIneSe workerS could See 
better acceSS to SerVIceS under 
HUkoU SyStem reform
The Chinese government has recently 
shown signs that it is considering reform-
ing the hukou system, which requires all 
citizens to be registered in their places of 
birth and has made it difficult for those 
with rural registration to access social 
services when they move to urban areas. 
Hukou, in place since 1958, limits individ-
uals’ access to social services, such as pen-
sions, employment benefits, health care, 
public schooling, and access to university 
entrance exams, by barring citizens from 
utilizing such services when outside their 
registered geographic region. Designation 
of hukou status is inherited, so children 
face the same restrictions as their parents. 
Management and implementation of the 
hukou system is a function of the provin-
cial governments, thus efforts to reform 
generally come from provinces. Though 
many smaller cities have lowered barri-
ers for workers to change resident status, 
many larger cities, including Beijing and 
Shanghai, have not, due to fears of rapid 
urban migration. Currently, only forty 
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percent of the considerable population that 
has internally relocated in search of work 
has been able to obtain either permanent 
or temporary resident status in urban areas.
As a result, rural residents are forced 
to make difficult choices when relocating 
in search of employment: either leave their 
children so they may attend compulsory 
public school or bring them and pay for 
private schooling. The estimated nineteen 
million children who were brought to urban 
areas under these circumstances chose 
either to attend private schools established 
specifically for children without residen-
tial hukou or receive no education. In spite 
of this, more than 200 million Chinese 
workers have left rural areas — leaving 
behind benefits and sometimes family — 
in search of better, though limited, employ-
ment in urban areas. According to a survey 
done in 2006 by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, a government organ, 
the income of urban residents was over 
three times that of rural residents.
In addition to the country’s constitu-
tional guarantee of state-subsidized health 
care, education, and pensions to all of 
its citizens, China is obligated under the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to 
respect the right to education (Article 13). 
Article 13 requires compulsory and avail-
able primary education, the general avail-
ability of secondary education, and equal 
access to higher education, though reports 
indicate that children from rural areas have 
fewer educational opportunities and must 
pay for those they do have. The ICESCR 
further requires States Parties to promote 
equality and fairness in wages and free-
dom in pursuit of employment, particularly 
with regard to the freedom of choice and 
equality in the workplace (Articles 6 and 
7). However, a report published by the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights described the hukou system 
as “de facto discrimination against internal 
migrants in the fields of employment, 
social security, health services, housing 
and education.” Such workers, according 
to the government-owned China’s Global 
Times newspaper, are treated as “illegal 
immigrants in their own country.”
As a State Party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), China has accepted the obliga-
tion to preserve citizens’ freedom of move-
ment and residence as enumerated in the 
Article 12 of the treaty. The UN Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 
27 to the treaty, on Freedom of Movement 
(Article 12), highlights the right to move 
freely within the whole national terri-
tory as indispensable. The hukou system 
requires that those who decide to move 
sacrifice essential services.
Though the central government has yet 
to mandate national reform, in 2008, the 
Deputy Secretary General of the National 
Development and Reform Commission 
stated the hukou system would be elimi-
nated by 2020. In December 2012, the 
Chinese government issued statements that 
it remains concerned about a rapid influx 
of movement to cities but that it still 
intends to reform the hukou system by 
streamlining the process of changing reg-
istration in order to increase the income-
generating power and spending ability of 
rural residents who move to urban areas. 
Should reform or elimination of the hukou 
system come to fruition, China would take 
a significant step toward greater access to 
services for its citizens regardless of their 
birthplace and simultaneously break a bar-
rier to upward mobility that has stood in 
the way of millions of Chinese people.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
the PhIlIPPIneS PaSSeS the 
ProgreSSIVe antI-enforced 
dISaPPearance act
The Philippines has a long history of 
enforced disappearances, numbering in the 
two thousands since the dictatorship of 
Ferdinand Marcos when martial law was 
enacted in the 1970s, according to The New 
York Times. However, in December 2012, 
President Benigno S. Aquino III approved 
the Republic Act 10353, known as the “Anti-
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance 
Act of 2012,” which was passed by the 
Philippine Congress in October. This Act 
targets state agents and officials who con-
fined or arrested individuals without proper 
process and detained those individuals out-
side the law’s protection.
The Act defines enforced disappear-
ance as “the arrest, detention, abduction 
or any other form of deprivation of liberty 
committed by agents of the State” or by 
those “acting with the authorization, sup-
port or acquiescence of the State followed 
by a refusal to acknowledge the depriva-
tion of liberty or by concealment of the 
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared 
person, which places such person outside 
the protection of the law.” The Act defines 
“enforced disappearance” with the same 
wording as the United Nations International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, which the 
Philippines has neither signed, ratified, nor 
is a state party to.
Those forced into disappearance, usu-
ally political dissidents, are often subject 
to torture and abuse at the hands of state 
officials and are outside the realm of the 
law’s protection since their detainment 
is not publicly registered. This treatment 
conflicts with the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
Philippines ratified in 1986, under Article 
9, the right to not be subject to arbi-
trary arrest and detention. Abuse of this 
nature also implicates the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
which the Philippines acceded to in 1986.
In an effort to build upon the substan-
tial decrease of enforced disappearances 
since the Marcos regime, when many polit-
ical opponents were arbitrarily arrested 
and tortured, the new law seeks to prevent 
future enforced disappearances. The new 
law will prohibit all disappearances and 
does not permit suspension of that prin-
ciple. Specifically, if a superior officer 
orders a subordinate to disappear some-
one, the superior officer can be penalized 
and the subordinate officer has the right 
to defy the order. According to the law, 
there must be up-to-date registration of all 
detained persons and detention facilities. 
All detained individuals also have the right 
to communicate their whereabouts to oth-
ers. To cut off a mechanism of enforced 
disappearances, the law prohibits “orders 
of battle” — a document listing all the sup-
posed enemies of the State.
Furthermore, all those who “directly 
committed,” “encouraged,” “cooperated,” 
“allowed…or abetted” the act of enforced 
disappearance will be subject to a pen-
alty of reclusion perpetua — essentially 
life imprisonment. Individuals who had 
knowledge that the act of enforced dis-
appearance transpired, without actually 
having participated in the act itself, face 
imprisonment as well. The individuals who 
have knowledge of the occurrence of such 
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acts of enforced disappearance have a duty 
to report the act to the Department of the 
Interior and Local Government. Victims of 
enforced disappearance and their relatives 
are entitled to monetary compensation 
and “restitution of honor and reputation.” 
Those penalized for committing this act 
are allowed no amnesty.
According to Section 18 of the law, a 
trial and decision for violating this act in 
a Filipino court is independent of the trial 
and decision of an international court using 
international human rights laws. Although 
the Act is laudable and provides progres-
sive change, the Philippines has still not 
ratified the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, which was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 
2006 and entered into force in 2010. The 
Philippines could comprehensively tackle 
the issue of enforced disappearance by 
acceding to this Convention since its Article 
26 allows for the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances to monitor such disappear-
ances within states. Without a mechanism 
to monitor disappearances and enforce the 
new act, there is no outside oversight to 




A growing occurrence of rural prostitu-
tion, sex tourism, and traditional notions 
of gender bias contribute to the prevalence 
of prostitution and the sex trafficking in 
India. According to India’s federal police, 
more than one million children are prosti-
tuted in India — “a source, transit nation, 
and destination” of the sexual-slavery 
industry. The actual numbers on sex traf-
ficking in India are more difficult to ascer-
tain because of the “clandestine nature” of 
sex trafficking, but India’s Home Secretary 
commented that around 100 million people 
“were [also] involved in human trafficking in 
India.” Although most victims are girls who 
are trafficked within India, many are also 
girls who are trafficked across borders from 
Nepal and Bangladesh and sent to urban red 
light areas in Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata.
An internationally accepted definition 
of trafficking, as defined by the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons Especially Women and 
Children, which supplements the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UN TIP, Protocol), is 
the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons” by using 
“force[,] . . . coercion, abduction, fraud, 
[and] deception” to control and exploit 
another person, including, but not limited 
to, sex exploitation.
The Indian Constitution under Article 
23 specifically prohibits human traffick-
ing, asserting that all citizens have the 
right to be protected from exploitation. 
Rampant and ongoing sex trade in India 
clearly violates the Indian Constitution and 
other domestic anti-trafficking legislation, 
and it simultaneously implicates India’s 
obligations under the many international 
treaties against trafficking in persons that 
India has ratified.
More than fifty years ago, India ratified 
without reservation the UN Convention 
for the Suppression of the Traffick in 
Persons, which instructs States Parties 
to punish any person who “[e]xploits the 
prostitution of another person,” even with 
the person’s consent. In Articles 1 and 
2 of the Convention, it further instructs 
States Parties to punish any person who 
“procures, entices, or leads away” another 
person for the purposes of prostitution, a 
person who manages and finances broth-
els, and a person who knowingly rents out 
facilities “for the purpose of prostitution 
of others.”
Shortly after ratifying this Convention, 
India enacted domestic anti-trafficking 
legislation, the Immoral Traffic Prevention 
Act (ITPA) of 1956 (later amended in 
1986). The ITPA punishes brothel own-
ers, brothel managers, and traffickers with 
prison terms ranging from three years to 
life. The passage of this law indicates the 
legislature’s positive intent in fulfilling 
India’s international obligations. Despite 
this, the inclusion of Section 7, which 
penalizes those who prostitute in or near 
public places, and Section 8, which penal-
izes the solicitation of sex, both of which 
have in practice justified the police’s arrest 
and imprisonment of trafficked women 
who have been forced into prostitution and 
who have no knowledge or control over 
the brothel’s proximity to public places. 
Amending the law to exclude Sections 7 
and 8 would decriminalize the activities 
of trafficking victims who are forced to 
solicit for sex. In 2006, a bill to amend the 
ITPA was proposed by India’s Ministry of 
Women and Child Development, which 
would decriminalize prostitution and 
instead would penalize prostitutes’ clients. 
The law currently contains provisions that 
penalize brothel owners, managers, and 
traffickers. However, the bill did not pass.
Most recently, in 2011, India signed 
the UN TIP, thus reaffirming the country’s 
desire to combat sex trafficking within 
the country. The goals of this protocol are 
to “prevent and combat trafficking” and 
“protect and assist the victims of such traf-
ficking,” especially women and children.
The Ministry of Home Affairs also set 
up specialized police units in major Indian 
cities in 2011 with the sole task of inves-
tigating sex trafficking cases and arresting 
traffickers and brothel owners and manag-
ers. These police officers were specially 
trained and sensitized to understand how 
trafficking rings operate. However, the 
police lack the resources to investigate and 
make arrests on every trafficking case. 
For example, police in West Bengal have 
called for faster rehabilitation and effec-
tive “social welfare and judiciary systems” 
that can put violators of the ITPA on trial 
and ensure they are not “out on bail.” In 
Mumbai in 2011, 242 sex-trafficking cases 
were prosecuted and 125 sex-trafficking 
perpetrators were convicted in accordance 
with ITPA, resulting in prison terms of three 
years. Although these numbers indicate a 
positive change, the overall conviction rate 
is low. If the ITPA conviction rate remains 
low, it will allow traffickers to perpetuate 
and sustain the slave trade and the violation 
of victims’ basic human rights.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
ageISm aS State PolIcy In 
taJIkIStan
For any young Tajiks looking for a gov-
ernment job, things are looking up. But for 
the aging population of Tajikistan, a recent 
executive order requiring officials to fire 
all government employees who are over 
the age of 63 for men and 58 for women 
brings only bad tidings. The government 
said the policy is designed to increase its 
use of technology, but some worry that 
the ruling will exacerbate the decline of 
Tajikistan’s intellectual capital. If the rul-
ing is implemented, government employ-
ees who are of age to receive a pension 
will be automatically fired despite their 
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desire to continue working, their qualifi-
cations, and a lack of qualified replace-
ments. By firing workers because of their 
age, Tajikistan’s ruling violates Articles 
6 and 7 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), Articles 2 and 23 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), and Article 12 of the Madrid 
International Plan of Action on Ageing 
(MIPAA). It also violates Tajikistan’s own 
constitution and labor codes.
By forcing older government employ-
ees to stop working, the regime is essen-
tially condemning them to poverty. Though 
government salaries are low, government 
pensions are even worse and they do 
not allow workers to use their positions 
to make extra money, for example, by 
teachers giving private lessons or doctors 
seeing patients outside of their regular 
office hours. Reports indicate that as of 
early January, more than thirty profes-
sors have already been fired from their 
positions at two of Tajikistan’s universi-
ties. Government sources say they face a 
predicament of what to do: either ignore 
the regime’s orders and face potential pun-
ishment, or fire those over the specified 
age. Former Education Minister Munira 
Inoyatova told EurasiaNet.org “many 
pension-age veteran employees possess 
huge human, organizational and scientific 
potential. To reject this potential is to 
deprive the country of a decent future.” 
Inoyatova also said that public anger is ris-
ing on the issue.
By firing people based on their age and 
prohibiting them from working, Tajikistan’s 
government is acting contrary to Articles 
6 and 7 the ICESCR, which guarantee 
the right to work and make a decent liv-
ing, respectively. Tajikistan acceded to the 
ICESCR in 1999, making it binding on 
the country. In addition to the ICESCR, 
this ruling also defies Tajikistan’s own 
constitution and labor codes. Article 35 of 
the Tajik Constitution protects the right of 
all people to work, to choose their profes-
sion, and to have their job protected. The 
Constitution also states that “any kind 
of limitation in employment relations is 
forbidden.” Section 7 of Tajikistan’s Labor 
Code specifically prohibits discrimination 
in employment based on age. Firing work-
ers from their jobs because they reach a 
certain age puts the Tajik regime at odds 
with its own law, international law, and 
internationally recognized norms.
In addition to the inconsistency with 
binding law, this ruling also contradicts 
internationally recognized norms. Article 
2 of the UDHR states that all people are 
entitled to the same rights without distinc-
tion of any kind and Article 23 defends the 
right to work and protects against unem-
ployment. The UN General Assembly (GA) 
adopted MIPAA in 2002. It was the first 
global agreement recognizing older people 
as contributors to their societies and ask-
ing governments to include older persons 
in all social and economic development 
policies. Article 12 of the MIPAA explains 
that older people should have the opportu-
nity to work, for as long as they wish and 
are able to, in satisfying and productive 
work. Though the UDHR and MIPAA are 
not legally binding, both were adopted by 
the GA and constitute international norms. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) stated in its doc-
ument Human Rights of Older Persons that 
non-discrimination is an existing human 
rights norm that must be applied to older 
people. Guidance from OHCHR indicates 
that international standards of non-dis-
crimination also apply to older persons, 
thus making the provisions of the ICESCR 
and the UDHR applicable to that group.
Freelance writer, Konstantin Parshin 
noted that Tajiks are raising interesting 
questions about the new order, and asked 
if Tajikistan’s older leaders will step down 
due to their advanced age. Perhaps the 
Tajik government will recognize that this 
new ruling will not only hurt many of its 
citizens, but it may hurt the country as 
well. Low government salaries push young 
Tajiks to the private sector and abroad. 
With high unemployment and emigration, 
there are not many skilled workers left to 
fill vacancies. Without the experience and 
knowledge of older workers, Tajikistan 
will not be propelled forward the way the 
government is hoping and it may even 
regress backwards.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
euroPe
ukraInIan legISlatIon threatenS 
freedom of exPreSSIon of the 
lgbt communIty
A proposed Ukrainian bill commonly 
referred to as the “gay gag law” passed 
its initial reading on October 2, 2012. If 
signed into law, this bill would drastically 
restrict the right to free speech of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 
persons. The Ukrainian draft law, officially 
known as bill number 8711 and backed by 
the ruling Regions Party, would criminal-
ize the promotion of homosexuality with 
fines of approximately USD $10,000 or 
up to five years’ imprisonment. The bill 
would impact discussion of homosexuality 
in the printed media, television, and radio 
by adding a provision on responsibility 
for the propagation of homosexuality to 
an article of the criminal code section 
related to propagating violence, cruelty, 
racial, national, or religious intolerance 
and discrimination.
The bill’s potential reach is unclear, 
although some groups speculated that it 
would include limitations on the right 
for LGBT persons to assemble and even 
engage in handholding or other public 
displays of affection. If the bill passes its 
second reading, it will be signed into law 
at the president’s discretion. According 
to poll data collected by AIDS Alliance, 
Ukrainian voters favor the law — 78% of 
the country views homosexuality nega-
tively and 61% of Kiev residents believe 
that promoting homosexuality should be 
punished by a prison sentence. Only 11% 
oppose any punishment.
Upon proposal, the bill evoked swift 
condemnation from human rights organi-
zations and international bodies on an issue 
that implicates traditional concepts of free 
expression as well as an emerging field of 
LGBT rights. On the intergovernmental 
level, the European Parliament condemned 
the bill and adopted a resolution calling for 
Ukraine to shelve the law, citing the UN 
Human Rights Committee’s stance that leg-
islation of this kind is discriminatory and 
infringes on free speech rights. Watchdog 
nongovernmental organizations also 
weighed in, with Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch calling for the 
rejection of the bill because it would 
discriminate against the LGBT commu-
nity, violate members of the community's 
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rights to freedom of expression and peace-
ful assembly, and limit children’s ability 
to receive and transmit information. The 
two groups wrote a joint letter to the 
Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, the 
Verkhovna Rada, detailing their concerns. 
The International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ) and the International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association 
(ILGA-Europe) also condemned the draft.
The bill’s critics point to its lack of 
clear definitions for the behaviors that it 
seeks to criminalize. The organizations 
that condemned the draft law empha-
sized that it could obstruct the work of 
human rights defenders, endanger LGBT 
activists and their families, and increase 
Ukraine’s already skyrocketing HIV rate. 
Supporters of the bill, including Ruslan 
Kukharchuk, a founder of the local group 
Love Against Homosexuality, speculated 
that one interpretation of the law could 
outlaw handholding and other common 
public displays of affection. Without clear 
definitions, courts would likely be left to 
interpret the scope of the phrase “promo-
tion of homosexuality.”
In addition to domestic concerns, the 
bill would also implicate Ukraine’s treaty 
obligations under both the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 11 
of the ECHR protects freedom of assem-
bly and association, which critics argue 
could be curtailed under the scope of the 
bill. Relevant to the concern is Ukraine’s 
violent halting of a gay rights march in 
2012 while allowing without incident an 
“anti-gay parade.” Similarly, Article 19 of 
the ICCPR protects freedom of expression 
with an allowance for restrictions “[f]or 
respect of the rights or reputations of oth-
ers,” or “[f]or the protection of national 
security or of public order . . . or of public 
health or morals.” Article 21 of the ICCPR 
protects the freedom of assembly with 
similar restrictions. Additionally, Article 
14 of the ECHR calls for a prohibition 
of discrimination. The European Court 
of Human Rights has held Article 14 to 
encompass sexual orientation since its 
1999 decision in Mouta v. Portugal, and 
affirmed the recognition of LGBT protec-
tions on par with those of race, origin, or 
color in relation to speech in its 2012 deci-
sion in Vejdeland v. Sweden.
The recognition of these rights has 
placed European political organizations 
and human rights groups at odds with 
legislation in the region concerning limi-
tations of LGBT rights. Both Lithuania 
and Moldova are considering legislation 
similar to the Ukrainian bill, while Russia 
has already passed similar laws in several 
districts and is under pressure from some 
factions to enact national legislation. If 
the proposed laws are enacted, they would 
codify the lack of cultural acceptance of 
LGBT individuals on a national level — 
an approach in clear conflict with both 
European and international trends. This 
would create a rift in the growing move-
ment toward recognition of equal protec-
tion for political and cultural rights of 
LGBT individuals that could spread to 
other similarly situated states.
turkey crackS down on oPPoSItIon 
In maSS arreSt of lawyerS and 
JournalIStS
More than eighty Turkish citizens, 
including journalists, lawyers, teachers, 
and students, were detained as part of a 
mass arrest that took place in the early 
morning hours of January 18, 2013. The 
arrests occurred in seven Turkish cities, at 
both residential addresses and law offices, 
under the authority of Article 7 of the 
Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991. The gov-
ernment accused those detained of being 
members of the Revolutionary People’s 
Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), labeled 
a terrorist organization by the Turkish 
and United States governments as well 
as the European Union. Significantly, the 
Turkish government applied a “secrecy 
decision” to the case, whereby no details 
are released to the defendants’ lawyers. 
Reports out of Turkey include accusations 
that several journalists were beaten and 
one was deprived of the use of his inhaler 
for twenty-four hours while in police cus-
tody. The lawyers arrested have denied any 
connection to the DHKP-C, and instead 
claim to be members of groups such as 
the Contemporary Lawyers Association 
(CHD), the Peoples Law Office, and the 
Progressive Lawyers Association — all of 
which speak out against the government 
and work to protect human rights.
Mass arrests have become frequent 
tactic used by the Turkish government. 
Since 2009, reports indicate that the gov-
ernment has arrested more than 8,000 
politicians, trade-unionists, journalists, 
artists, students, human rights advocates, 
and lawyers. A December 2012 report by 
the Committee to Protect Journalists found 
that Turkey is the world’s leader in the 
jailing of journalists, with at least 49 such 
individuals reported as under detention at 
the time of the study’s release. Although 
the Turkish Government has justified the 
arrest by using its Anti-Terror Law, watch-
dog groups such as Amnesty International 
have criticized the law for being vague, 
overly broad, and used to prosecute legiti-
mate peaceful activities.
Turkey is a State Party to both the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Under these documents and Turkey’s own 
Constitution, Turkish citizens are entitled 
to protection from arbitrary arrest and 
detention and are guaranteed freedom 
of opinion and expression in the media. 
Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits arbi-
trary arrest and detention, and provides 
that arrests must be conducted according 
to legal procedure. Turkish law dictates 
that both a prosecutor and a bar associa-
tion representative must be present during 
the search of law offices. Turkish police 
ignored these laws when they searched the 
People’s Law Office without an attending 
prosecutor, and reports of beatings sus-
tained by those arrested indicate further 
deviation from Turkey’s treaty obligations. 
Additionally, Article 19 of the Turkish 
Constitution provides that a person who is 
arrested has the right to be released during 
the ensuing investigation and prosecution. 
Although several journalists have been 
released on substantial bail, six are still 
in detention despite treaty obligations that 
would provide for their release.
The ICCPR, the ECHR, and Turkey’s 
Constitution all protect freedom of expres-
sion in private life and media activities. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 
of the ECHR protect the right to personal 
expression of beliefs and opinions that do 
not interfere with national security — a 
right also guaranteed by Article 25 of 
Turkey’s Constitution. Additionally, both 
the ICCPR and Turkey’s Constitution con-
tain articles protecting freedom of expres-
sion of private citizens with the same 
narrow limitation meant to protect against 
threats to national security.
Both the European Union and the 
United Nations have expressed concerns 
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about the arrests. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers stated in a 2012 
publication that the judiciary in Turkey 
needs “to ensure that the measures used 
to combat terrorism are compatible with 
international human rights principles and 
standards.” The targeting of dissenting 
journalists and human rights lawyers in 
these mass arrests infringes upon these stan-
dards by both censoring speech and creating 
a chilling effect. By invoking the national 
security exceptions within both domestic 
and international law, the Turkish govern-
ment has taken a broad reading of the 
Turkish Anti-Terror Law that pushes the 
boundaries of domestic and international 
obligations. While the European Court of 
Human Rights could weigh in on these 
boundaries, in its absence Turkey shows 
no signs of halting its policies. In 2009, 
the Court received 6,500 complaints con-
cerning freedom of the press and freedom 
of expression; in 2011, the number rose to 
9,000. The situation has caused, and will 
continue to cause, a lesser degree of secu-
rity for those who seek to bring both legal 
protection and exposure of the govern-
ment’s inadequacies to the Turkish people.
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
mIddle eaSt and north afrIca
2022 world cuP and the 
exPloItatIon of mIgrant workerS 
In qatar
In December 2010, Qatar received the 
honor of becoming the first Arab country 
to host the FIFA (Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association) World Cup. In 
preparation for the 2022 games, Qatar 
will spend an estimated $100 billion USD 
on infrastructure and require a workforce 
exceeding its 300,000 official citizens. 
Although Qatar’s official citizenry is one 
of the smallest in the world, the country is 
home to an additional 1.2 million migrant 
laborers — primarily from India, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. 
These laborers comprise 94% of the entire 
Qatari population.
As a member of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), Qatar is obli-
gated to comply with a set of minimum 
employment standards. However, because 
the Qatari government has yet to ratify any 
substantive treaties relating to collective 
bargaining rights and wage protection, the 
migrant laborers are being exploited so 
the country will have its high-tech stadiums 
ready in time for the games. This exploita-
tion will undoubtedly continue until Qatar 
chooses to provide migrant laborers with the 
right to negotiate for more equitable employ-
ment terms and safer working conditions.
To obtain a construction job, work-
ers are required to pay a fee up to $3,651 
USD. Because this sum is not readily avail-
able to the workers, many must mortgage 
family properties in their native countries 
or take out loans with high interest rates. 
While working, laborers earn wages — 
between $6.75 to $11 USD per day — 
so low that they cannot leave their jobs 
without being subject to financial ruin. 
The ILO Convention on Forced Labour 
defines compulsory labor as “all work or 
service which is exacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered 
himself voluntarily.” Because the laborers 
are willingly entering into employment 
contracts with the construction compa-
nies, the conventions regarding forced or 
compulsory labor do not offer protection 
for the laborers — despite the inability 
for workers to leave employment at will. 
As a member of the ILO, Qatar is broadly 
required to promote the right to collec-
tive bargaining. However, because Qatar 
has not ratified the Protection of Wages 
Convention, which “prohibits methods of 
payment which deprive the worker of 
a genuine possibility of terminating his 
employment,” Qatar is not obligated to 
restructure the payment system or elimi-
nate the application fee.
Working conditions for laborers who 
obtain a construction job also blur the 
line of acceptability. Human Rights Watch 
reported that a typical worker living in a 
labor camp sleeps with as many as 25 other 
people in a single room and does not have 
access to potable water or air-condition-
ing. Many workers have also reported an 
absence of medical care and a denial of 
free movement. Currently, Qatari labor laws 
prohibit labor unions and do not establish 
a minimum wage. Without the ability to 
unionize, the workers are powerless.
Qatar has also received media atten-
tion concerning allegations of unreported 
deaths at the construction sites. The Right 
to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention provides that any national laws 
relating to workmen’s compensation for 
accidents arising out of employment shall 
be equally applicable to all persons. The 
Qatar National Health Strategy recently 
reported that workplace injuries are the 
third highest cause of accidental death in 
Qatar. However, the Qatari Ministry of Labor 
has only reported six work-related accidents 
during the last three years. Qatar has not 
updated this number despite information 
provided by the countries sending laborers 
into the country for construction jobs.
The Supreme Committee for Qatar 
2022, FIFA’s representative commit-
tee that is overseeing site construction, 
has reflected its dedication to preventing 
forced labor or human trafficking and 
has agreed to develop “mandatory con-
tract language and assurance protocols” 
to address labor disputes. FIFA recently 
decided to add labor standards to the 
list of criterion required for future World 
Cup bids. However, even if FIFA and the 
Supreme Committee are able to reform 
labor practices at the World Cup sites, 
other migrant laborers in Qatar will remain 
unprotected. For the migrant laborers of 
Qatar to achieve any long-term changes in 
the labor system, the involvement of the 
Qatari government process is necessary.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
VIolatIonS agaInSt human rIghtS 
defenderS In bahraIn and the 
unIted arab emIrateS
Throughout the Middle East, human 
rights defenders (HRDs) are forced to 
choose between their values and their 
personal security. Recent media attention 
has focused on Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), where the gov-
erning regimes are consistently targeting 
HRDs. These are not the only countries 
in the region where this problem exists, 
but consistent violations of international 
law merit a discussion of their implica-
tions. By arresting peaceful protesters, 
not providing fair trials, and criminal-
izing dissent, Bahrain and the UAE have 
disregarded the individual rights pro-
tected in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR), 
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and the Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders (DHRD).
Recently in Bahrain, human rights 
defenders have been arrested and detained 
for organizing and participating in anti-
government demonstrations and posting 
about anti-government protests on social 
media sites. The Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights (BCHR) condemned these arrests 
and detentions, saying that they are aimed 
at thwarting human rights work in Bahrain. 
The group claimed that government action 
against HRDs is part of an effort to stop citi-
zens from practicing their rights to freedom 
of expression and assembly. BCHR said it 
believes that Bahraini authorities have been 
using an unfair judiciary to target critics of 
the government. The Bahraini government 
alleged that activists are disseminating false 
information through social media sites and 
that they are inciting violence during anti-
regime protests.
Bahrain acceded to the ICCPR in 2006; 
it is thus legally binding on the country. 
Article 9 of the ICCPR protects the rights 
not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained 
and to be informed of charges. Article 
14 of the ICCPR enshrines the right to a 
prompt and fair trial. Article 19 guarantees 
the right to freedom of expression and 
Article 21 the right to peaceful assembly. 
In Bahrain, these provisions of the ICCPR 
are being violated through the arrest and 
trial of HRDs. The arbitrary arrests car-
ried out by the Bahraini authorities are 
contrary to the standards of international 
law protecting those who are acting within 
their rights and calling for peaceful pro-
tests. Human Rights Watch reported that 
a prominent Bahraini HRD was charged 
with inciting violence, but that the court 
verdict cited no evidence that the HRD had 
actually participated in or advocated for 
violence. Other HRDs have experienced 
excessive delays in trial proceedings. For 
example, a lower court neglected to provide 
the necessary documents to the appeals 
court, resulting in the postponement of the 
appeal process and keeping HRDs detained 
longer. Article 14 of the ICCPR specifically 
guarantees the right to a fair trial by an 
independent and impartial court; Bahrain’s 
courts are not demonstrating impartiality 
and independence when it comes to HRDs.
Last month, UAE authorities enacted 
a new cybercrimes decree criminalizing 
online dissent against the state, effectively 
closing off the UAE’s last remaining forum 
for free speech. The law also criminalized 
unauthorized demonstrations. Recently, 
several HRDs have been arrested under 
the new decree for their alleged connec-
tion to Twitter accounts that have criticized 
the government. The Emirates Center 
for Human Rights (ECHR) reported that 
the authorities have refused to publicly 
disclose the reasons behind the arrests 
and will not say where the detainees are 
being kept. The ECHR said it believes that 
these arrests demonstrate state attempts to 
silence online criticism. The UAE govern-
ment insisted that the decree is intended 
to monitor online content to prevent the 
proliferation of racist or sectarian views 
and to defend state security.
Though the UAE has not ratified the 
ICCPR, it is a member of the Arab League, 
which adopted the ACHR. The Charter 
confirms the rights outlined in the ICCPR 
and includes similar articles. The ACHR 
creates binding obligations on members of 
the Arab League. By criminalizing dissent 
and revoking its citizens’ right to freedom 
of expression, a right protected by the 
ACHR, the UAE has not acted within the 
parameters of the ACHR.
A troubling aspect of Bahrain and 
UAE’s violations of international law is 
that they are specifically directed at HRDs. 
The DHRD guarantees the rights of HRDs. 
The DHRD is not legally binding but 
contains rights that are protected in other 
agreements, like the ICCPR. Because the 
DHRD was adopted by consensus in the 
UN General Assembly, it represents a strong 
commitment by the international commu-
nity to its implementation. Bahrain and the 
UAE can come into line with international 
laws and norms by ending the targeting of 
HRDs and taking measures to protect them.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Sub-Saharan afrIca
kamPala conVentIon breakS new 
ground for ProtectIng Internally 
dISPlaced PerSonS
The African Union Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa, known as 
the Kampala Convention, entered into 
force on December 6, 2012. The Kampala 
Convention is the first binding interna-
tional convention containing State obliga-
tions and rights of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). This represents an express 
recognition by the African Union (AU) 
of the inadequate protections for IDPs in 
Africa, which accounts for forty percent 
of the world’s IDPs, and it is the result of a 
process dating back to 2004 when the AU 
Executive Council announced its intention 
to draft a treaty addressing IDPs.
IDPs are persons who, without crossing 
internationally recognized borders, have 
been forced to flee their homes or places 
of habitual residence as a result of armed 
conflict, violence, human rights viola-
tions, or natural disasters. IDPs make up 
a far larger population than cross-border 
refugees, and one-third of the world’s IDP 
populations — approximately ten million 
persons — are found in 21 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
While states have increasingly rec-
ognized IDPs over the last two decades, 
the only previous international mechanism 
was the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, soft law issued by the UN 
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs in 1998. Although non-binding, 
the Guiding Principles have served as the 
basis for subsequent binding mechanisms. 
The first incorporation of the Guiding 
Principles also occurred in Africa, at the 
sub-regional level, with the Great Lakes 
Pact. While the scope of the pact was much 
larger, Article 12 obligates its eleven mem-
ber states of the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region to adopt and 
implement the Guiding Principles.
Unlike the Guiding Principles and the 
Great Lakes Pact, the Kampala Convention 
is the first time states have enacted a 
treaty-based legal framework specifically 
for IDPs. The Kampala Convention has 
three overarching goals: (1) preventing or 
mitigating internal displacement; (2) protect-
ing and assisting IDPs; and (3) promoting 
solutions and support among member states. 
Although the Kampala Convention does not 
grant IDPs special legal status, similar to the 
situation for refugees, it does outline IDPs’ 
rights and circumstances where States must 
provide assistance to IDPs.
The Kampala Convention provides 
for important protections of IDPs’ rights. 
States must protect IDPs from human 
rights abuses including discrimina-
tion, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
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arbitrary killing, detention, torture, and 
sexual or gender-based violence. In 
addressing emerging trends of develop-
ment-induced IDPs, States have the duty to 
prevent development-based displacement 
by exploring alternatives and carrying out 
impact assessments. Unlike the Guiding 
Principles, which consider only large-
scale development projects, the Kampala 
Convention applies to development proj-
ects of any size.
As with most international conventions, 
States must meet these obligations with-
out discrimination on any grounds. The 
Kampala Convention obligates States to 
protect individuals from arbitrary displace-
ment and to promote IDPs’ human rights. 
It also requires that States ensure criminal 
prosecution of individuals responsible for 
causing displacement and violations of 
IDPs’ rights and that the States provide 
for “satisfactory conditions for voluntary 
return, local integration or relocation on a 
sustainable basis and in circumstances of 
safety and dignity.”
Article 5 of the Kampala Convention 
creates a positive duty for States to accept 
external humanitarian assistance. This 
requirement is the first of its kind in a 
human rights treaty and it is an extension 
of State obligations under international 
humanitarian law, which provides obliga-
tions of humane treatment and protection of 
civilian populations in times of armed con-
flict. Previously, only soft law provisions 
under international disaster response law 
have addressed state obligations to accept 
external assistance. As with the earlier soft 
law documents, the Kampala Convention’s 
obligation of third-party assistance only 
requires States to accept assistance when 
they lack adequate resources on their own. 
In these situations, the AU will act in a 
coordination capacity to target strengthen-
ing responses and resource mobilization. 
Furthermore, if a state’s unwillingness to 
accept assistance results in human rights 
violations in order to comply, the AU may 
intervene and assume the obligations under 
the Convention.
Although the Kampala Convention 
represents an important step forward in 
protecting IDPs, a few provisions may 
detract from its efficacy. Unlike the Great 
Lakes Pact, which grants jurisdiction over 
disputes on interpretation and implemen-
tation to the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (ACJHR), under the 
Kampala Convention States may refer 
disputes to the ACJHR only after nego-
tiations between States have broken down. 
Furthermore, the duty to accept external aid 
has a limiting clause stating, “nothing in 
this Article shall prejudice the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.” 
This possible weakness aside, the Kampala 
Convention is an important step forward in 
establishing binding protections for IDPs.
eVIdence of malIan armed grouPS’ 
VIolatIonS PredateS InternatIonal 
InterVentIon
Although the French-led international 
effort to aid the Malian government 
brought the human rights situation in Mali 
to the world’s attention, domestic ethnic 
strains reached a breaking point nearly a 
year before. Since the April 2012 seizure of 
northern Mali by Tuareg separatist rebels, 
Islamic armed forces, and Arab militias, 
violence among the various factions has left 
the Malian people particularly vulnerable.
The immediate conflict traces back to 
January 16, 2012, with a rebellion against 
the Malian government by armed groups 
seeking independence and autonomy for 
the Tuareg people in northern Mali, a 
region known as Azawad. The conflict 
developed a mix of political opposition 
to the Malian government, ethnic squab-
bling for control of territory, and religious 
extremism. By April, the ethnic Tuareg 
separatist group known as the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) controlled northern Mali. Islamist 
Ansar Dine, a group which sought to insti-
tute Sharia, the Islamic theological legal 
code, also joined the rebellion. After March 
2012 saw further destabilization follow-
ing MNLA success, government forces 
launched a coup d’état and instituted the 
National Council for the Restoration of 
Democracy and State (CNRDR) as the new 
government with the stated goal to “wage 
a total and relentless war” against MNLA. 
This coup d’état was met with international 
condemnation and subsequent sanctions 
from the UN Security Council, the African 
Union, and the Economic Community of 
West African States.
With disparate factions and growing 
instability, Malian civilians were caught 
in the middle of violence from multiple 
sides. Following the expulsion of govern-
ment forces in northern Mali, the ethnic 
tensions between the Tuareg MNLA and 
the National Liberation Front of Azawad 
(FNLA) undercut regional security. The 
FNLA opposed Tuareg rule in Azawad, 
which led the Front for Liberation of 
Azawad (FPA) to split off from the MNLA 
in opposition to Islamists and a focus 
on autonomy over independence. Within 
this vacuum of control, jihadist group 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
and its splinter group the Movement 
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MOJWA) also sought to gain a foot-
hold in the region. MOJWA has been in 
constant conflict with MNLA and has 
opposed Tuareg rule in Azawad.
In the course of taking over Azawad 
and through infighting, reports indicate 
numerous acts that could invoke interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) and human 
rights law, but the nature of the conflict 
leaves unclear what law even applies — 
and none of the legal distinctions have 
yet to deter any actions against Malian 
civilians.
Ansar Dine, MOJWA, and AQIM are 
reportedly using children as young as 
twelve — acts generally barred under the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict. Furthermore, 
reports from Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch indicate that these 
groups have engaged in summary execu-
tions, murder, abduction, inhumane treat-
ment — sometimes in support of Sharia 
law — and sexual and gender-based vio-
lence as prohibited in various human rights 
instruments to which Mali is a State Party.
In a conflict situation, such as in Mali, 
the limitations of human rights law become 
apparent. Although human rights law is 
already a difficult tool to utilize to prevent 
violations during an ongoing conflict, it is 
more difficult in Mali because it generally 
applies only to state actors, leaving ques-
tions about how it applies with no con-
trolling government. Although the human 
rights protections are in effect at all times, 
there is no enforceable obligation for non-
state actors.
Reported actions by these groups also 
implicate IHL, which in conflict situa-
tions can have a broader application than 
human rights law because it could apply to 
all parties involved. However, application 
depends on the characteristics of the situa-
tion — namely whether it can be classified 
as an armed conflict — and can also allow 
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for some violence that is a valid use of 
force in combat that would otherwise be 
banned under human rights law. Reports 
have indicated the various groups have 
targeted and pillaged hospitals, churches, 
and schools, which — if they were directly 
targeted — could implicate both Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and 
customary law.
The violations have prompted the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
open an investigation into the conflict and 
to reports of government forces engag-
ing in extra-judicial killings of suspected 
members of these armed groups. The obli-
gations for human rights violations will 
likely remain difficult to apply until a 
more stable government is reestablished, at 
which point the State would be responsible 
for protecting the application of rights to 
people within its borders.
Tyler Addison, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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